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What should educational institutions be for?  
James MacAllister, The University of Edinburgh 
In this article I respond to the work of Gert Biesta regarding the question of 
what education should be for. He maintains education ought to be oriented 
towards the ‘good’ rather than measurement, accountability and efficiency. 
While sympathetic to such claims, I nonetheless question his avowal that 
discussion of the purposes of education ‘needs’ to entail reflection upon 
tripartite processes of qualification, socialization and subjectification. I also 
argue that the concept of subjectification presented by Biesta is elusive. He 
says educators cannot plan to produce it in students. He also suggests there 
is an unhelpful surplus of reason in education that constrains possibilities for 
subjectification. According to Biesta, education partly reproduces ‘rational 
communities’ that stifle the emergence of human uniqueness and inhibit 
persons from challenging accepted social orders. In response to this, I argue 
there is currently a deficit rather than a surplus of reason in education 
concerning the common good. Following MacIntyre, I claim that educational 
institutions should support students to learn how to think for themselves and 
act for the common good. I conclude that such utopian thinking about the 
purposes of education may be needed, now, more than ever.  
Education in an age of measurement  
 
Gert Biesta (2009 & 2010) claims we live in an age of educational 
measurement. In this world education has become ever more centred around 
and driven by the measurement and comparison of student performance in 
high stakes assessments at local, national and international levels. He posits 
that a 'common sense' view of education is responsible for giving so much 
credence to international programmes of assessment like the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) and the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS). In the common sense (or 
qualification) view of education, academic achievement in a limited number of 
subjects like mathematics, language and science is most highly valued. 
However Biesta (2009) thinks the common sense view of education is flawed 
– education should be about more than just socialising students and helping 
them attain qualifications. Biesta implies that it is not just students who suffer 
in our era of educational measurement. There are increasing expectations 
that those engaged in educational research will generate evidence about what 
works, while teachers also now face working in conditions of excessive 
‘managerial accountability’ that have eroded opportunity for responsible 
professional action (2010 & 2015).  
 
Biesta thus argues that the emergence of a culture of measurement is 
problematic as it focuses the educational attention of students, parents, 
teachers and educational researchers on technical and instrumental values 
geared towards effectiveness rather than ultimate and normative values. He is 
  
not alone is voicing such concerns. For example, Ball (2003) maintains that in 
more recent times three technologies of educational reform (the market, 
managerialism and especially performativity) have contributed to significant 
alterations in educational institutions. At the centre of a performative view of 
teaching is an ever-expanding database of information about teacher, pupil, 
school and national school system performance (Ball, 2003). A database of 
information against which teachers and schools are held accountable for and 
whose performance they are measured against (Ball, 2003, Munday 2011). A 
regrettable consequence of the heightened focus on educational 
measurement is that teachers and schools are increasingly spending more 
time compiling information that ‘proves’ they are meeting policy targets or 
performing better than the ‘normal’ standards (Ball 2003). Significantly, it is 
not important that the data schools generate is actually true, only that it shows 
schools in a positive light and as effective (Ball, 2003). Teachers across the 
globe are thus increasingly working within an audit culture of international 
assessment and with a ‘horse race mentality’ (Kamens, 2013, p 117) where 
they are encouraged to think most about effective student performance in 
important exams. This shift in emphasis towards teaching and learning as 
effective performance inevitably means teachers and schools have less time 
to actually teach pupils on their own terms (Ball, 2003). 
 
The question of purpose in education 
 
Biesta argues that the more recent emphasis on assessment, measurement 
and accountability in education shuts down possibilities for wider thought and 
debate about the purposes of education (2009, 2010). He maintains that in 
the past twenty years or so a much greater focus has been placed upon the 
promotion of learning in education policy and practice rather than on 
education. He claims there are at least two problems associated with this rise 
in the language of learning (Biesta, 2009). First, while learning is an 
individualistic concept and generally refers to what a person can do alone 
(and on what is assessable), education is not something we can do alone - it 
instead requires relationships between persons (Biesta, 2009, 2010 & 2015). 
Second, learning is a term that does not require evaluation of the 
worthwhileness or otherwise of what is to be learned, or for that matter 
assessed. Biesta suggests that the new focus on student learning has been 
accompanied by an ever-greater assessment of student learning. However, 
the student learning that is most readily assessable may well not be that 
learning which is most educationally valuable  (Biesta, 2009, 2010). Here ‘the 
danger is that we end up valuing what is measured, rather than that we 
engage in measurement of what we value’ (2010, p 26).  
 
Biesta explains that when it comes to education (as opposed to learning): it 
‘matters what pupils and students learn and what they learn it for’ (2009, p 
39). Biesta’s plea for more discussion about the purposes of education thus 
seems to be a call for greater debate about the particular content of education 
allied to enhanced understanding of the reasons and motivations that persons 
have for engaging in education. However, Biesta seems reluctant to become 
bogged down in discussion of the particular things that students should learn 
  
and for what reasons. Indeed, he maintains that he does not want to specify 
what he thinks the purposes of education should be (Biesta, 2009, 2010, 
2012). He rather sets himself the more ‘modest’ task of raising awareness of 
some of the functions that education systems actually do serve in the hope 
this will lead to further and richer debate about the aims and purposes of 
education. In this respect he argues that education systems perform three 
main functions: qualification, socialisation and subjectification.  
 
Biesta on what education is for 
 
Biesta explains that the qualification function of education provides young 
persons with the knowledge, habits, skills and understanding to do something 
in the world after their formal education has been completed. Qualification is 
particularly linked with the contribution education can make to economic 
growth via the training of a future workforce. However, it is also more than 
mere certification or preparation for the world of work - it contributes to the 
development of political and cultural literacy in young persons (Biesta, 2009, 
2010). In this respect the qualification function partly resembles the 
socialisation function of education which: ‘inserts individuals into existing ways 
of doing and being and, through this, plays an important role in the 
continuation of culture and tradition – both with regard to its desirable and its 
undesirable aspects’ (Biesta, 2009, p 40). Biesta explains that socialisation 
may be both intentional (through the active transmission of community 
knowledge, norms and values), or a less intentional effect of education 
systems as in the case of the hidden curriculum.  
 
He argues that the subjectification function is in many respects the ‘opposite 
of the socialisation function. It is precisely not about the insertion of 
‘newcomers’ into existing orders, but about ways of being that hint at 
independence from such orders; ways of being in which the individual is not 
simply a ‘specimen’ of a more encompassing order (2009, p 40)’. Biesta 
states that there can be little doubt that education systems do perform the 
functions of socialisation and qualification. However, he is less confident that 
education systems always perform the function of subjectification, remarking 
that for some ‘the actual influence of education can be confined to 
qualification and socialisation’ (2009, p 40). Biesta however is willing to put his 
head above the parapet a little here regarding what education should be for, 
arguing that any education worthy of the name should also always contribute 
to subjectification (2010, p 75) and to activities that ‘allow those being 
educated to become more autonomous and independent in their thinking and 
acting’ (2009, p 41). Thus for Biesta, education should ideally entail a balance 
of qualification, socialisation and subjectification but it is perhaps too often 
actually only for qualification and socialisation. 
 
What should be made of these ‘functions’ and their capacity to generate 
debate about the purposes of education? They do probably have capacity to 
raise awareness of the increased prevalence of formal assessment and 
measurement within many education systems. Here I am sympathetic to 
  
Biesta’s point that many education systems currently over do and over value 
student assessment and teacher and school accountability for the results of 
such assessments. In this respect he argues that the prevailing tendency 
within society is to most highly value ‘academic’ qualifications, pointing out 
that this regrettably serves to reproduce inequality in society (Biesta, 2009 & 
2010). Those students who attain the highest qualifications in school and/or 
university are after all more likely to be able to access higher paid jobs in the 
future than students who have fewer distinctively ‘academic’ qualifications 
(Nunn et al 2007). Biesta’s doubt that education systems do in fact promote 
subjectification also reveals how many education systems may be too 
qualification and socialisation orientated, perhaps especially towards the end 
of formal schooling when so much attention is given to pupil performance in 
high stakes assessments. Biesta is probably right then to suggest that 
awareness of the some of the key functions of education might lead to more 
informed discussions about what education should be for. 
 
However, in taking what is the case in education as the starting point for 
debate about the purposes of education, I think Biesta might be inadvertently 
limiting imaginative thought about what education systems could or indeed 
should set out to achieve. Indeed, as I shall now argue, there are at least 
three difficulties with Biesta's framework for considering the purposes of 
education. Firstly, it is overly prescriptive. This has the unfortunate effect of 
marginalising traditions of educational thought that do not conform to his 
system. Secondly, it does not consider in sufficient detail the variety of ways 
in which the pursuit of knowledge may be educational. Thirdly, the concept of 
subjectification presented by Biesta is rather elusive. He claims that educators 
cannot plan to produce it in students. He also seems to suggest that there is a 
damaging surplus of reason in education that stultifies the goal of 
subjectification. In response to this, in the final sections of the paper I argue 
that there is currently a deficit rather than a surplus of reason in education 
concerning the common good. Following MacIntyre, I claim that educational 
institutions should support students to learn how to think for themselves and 
act for the common good. 
 
Biesta on good education  
 
‘In order to bring issues of value and purpose back into our 
discussions about education, particularly in situations in which 
measurement figures prominently, we therefore need to 
reengage with the question as to what constitutes good 
education’ (Biesta, 2010, p 14) 
 
Biesta's framework for promoting discussion about the purposes of education 
is very prescriptive in at least two ways. On the one hand Biesta seems to 
assume that considering the question of what education is for, is essentially a 
matter of thinking about what constitutes a 'good' education. On the other 
hand, he also states that determining what counts as a good education 
ultimately amounts to deciding which particular combination of socialisation, 
qualification and subjectification is most appealing and warrantable. 
  
Regarding the former, he implies there is no reason to question the purposes 
of education from a blank slate. Instead there is a particular ‘need’ to 
reconnect with the question of what constitutes a ‘good’ education in 
situations where measurement agendas dominate (2010). Quite why 
discussion about the purposes of education is collapsed down into what 
constitutes good education is not clearly explained. This strikes me as a 
rather perplexing and reductive way of trying to open up debate about the 
purposes of education. I do accept Biesta’s implication that a good education 
is not synonymous with an effective one. However, contrary to Biesta, I do not 
think it is necessary to focus on the issue of what constitutes ‘good’ education 
in order to overcome the view that effectiveness is all education should be for.  
Moreover, while Biesta (2010) acknowledges that a wide range of views about 
the purposes of education already exists, he nonetheless insinuates that it is 
not possible to consider the purposes of education without reference to his 
threefold framework. He says that 'when we engage in discussions about 
what education should be for, we should do so in relation to these three 
dimensions...in reality there will always be a particular "mix" of the three 
purposes of education, which means that the real question is not whether we 
should opt for qualification, socialisation or subjectification but what particular 
combination we see as desirable and justifiable' (Biesta, 2010, p 5). In this 
short passage Biesta appears to be arguing that persons wanting to consider 
the purposes of education not only should – they ultimately must, do so in 
reference to his threefold frameworki. Contrary to Biesta however, I do not see 
why reflection on the purposes of education needs must entail reflection upon 
tripartite processes of socialisation, subjectification and qualification. Indeed, 
insistence that consideration of the ends of education amounts to no more 
than deciding which combination of socialisation, qualification and 
subjectification is desirable arguably marginalises traditions of educational 
thought that would not frame debate about the ends of education in such 
ways. There is of course a rich variety of literature concerning the purposes of 
education (see for example Whitehead, 1967; Hirst, 1968; Peters, 1981; 
Winch, 1996; Carr, 2000; White, 2007; Dewey, 2008 and Macmurray 2012) 
that is not framed around issues of socialization, subjectification and 
qualification.  
Pertinent to the context of this discussion is Peters claim, in Essays on 
Educators, that though the aims of education may be contestable, they are 
not completely so. That the aims of education may not be completely 
contestable does not mean that they need to be contested within the 
framework that Biesta proposes. Indeed, Peters shows that it is possible to 
construct a well thought out account of the aims of education without any 
need to discuss which combination of qualification, socialisation and 
subjectification is most desirable. Though Peters is perhaps best known for 
his argument that education should initiate students into worthwhile forms of 
  
knowledge (1970) in Essays on Educators he concedes that ‘though this is an 
aim of education, it is surely a very narrow one’ (1981, p 35). Peters therefore 
set out a range of other possible aims of education including self-fulfilment, a 
concern for truth and others, emotional and moral development, preparation 
for working life as well as the fostering of democratic values. Here Peters 
stresses that democracy requires widespread participation in public life as 
well as rational questioning and discussion of public policy (1981, p 37).  
However, as we shall go on to see, Biesta (unlike Peters and MacIntyre) 
suggests that communities today might be too rational, to their detriment. 
A second problem with Biesta's scheme is the pragmatist conception of 
knowledge that underpins it. He avers that the qualification function of 
education is especially concerned with (curriculum) content and indicates that 
he does not want to ‘downplay the importance of content in schooling’ (2010, 
p 104). In one sense curriculum content is valuable for pragmatic reasons of 
qualification – pragmatic as qualifications can help persons go on to do other 
things in later life. However, Biesta provides an articulate defense of other 
ways in which pragmatic knowledge is valuable elsewhere (2014). Drawing 
upon Dewey he maintains that pragmatic knowledge is intimately linked to 
reflection upon action and especially the solving of problems. Curriculum 
content might be especially valuable (from a pragmatist standpoint) when it 
helps persons build up knowledge on the basis of their experience and with 
an eye on future possibilities rather than past certainties.  
One would hope that students in educational institutions would build up 
knowledge at times with reference to their experiences and problems and with 
an eye on future possibilities. The implication, however, that curriculum 
knowledge will generally be concerned with the ‘certain’ and the ‘true’ unless it 
is underpinned by a pragmatist philosophy, rings a little false. Indeed I think 
most educators do not need to seek recourse to pragmatism in order to grasp 
that curriculum knowledge is generally a matter of probability and possibility 
rather than certainty. Perhaps a bigger issue with the pragmatist conception of 
knowledge adopted by Biesta is that it does not consider in sufficient detail the 
variety of ways in which the pursuit of knowledge may be educational above 
and beyond the pragmatic. The idea that students might benefit from pursuing 
knowledge for its own sake does not really figure in Biesta's framework for 
example.  
In fairness to Biesta, he does suggest that curriculum knowledge may be 
significant for reasons other than pragmatic or instrumental ones. It may also 
provide opportunities for subjectification. Biesta maintains that some will feel 
excluded from particular curricula - as curricula are always only a selection of 
what might be possible (2010, p 105). While ‘making abstract knowledge 
one’s own knowledge is not relevant’ to subjectification (2010, p 106), if 
  
knowledge content is ‘taken seriously’ it may provide a starting point for new 
entrances into the world, for new possibilities. However, the particular ways in 
which curriculum knowledge may enable subjectification are far from clear. 
Biesta seems reluctant to discuss the specific bodies of knowledge that might 
be most worthwhile for young persons to 'take seriously'. The concept of 
subjectification that Biesta presents readers with is, to my mind, rather 
elusive. This may be partly put down to issues of translation. Indeed, Biesta 
(2012) has acknowledged that the concept of subjectification may be difficult 
to comprehend in the English language. However, just because something 
may appear elusive does not mean that it should be dismissed - and Biesta 
does have something important to say regarding subjectification.  
The universal ‘Good’ and Education for Subjectification 
Biesta maintains that Immanuel Kant is a key figure in the history of the idea 
of educating for subjectification (2010). He argues that it was only after Kant 
that it became possible to distinguish between education as mere 
socialization (educating to insert newcomers into existing social orders) and 
education that involves aspects of subjectification (educating for human 
freedom from existing social orders). Kant famously argued that education 
should first involve a disciplined socialization into societies rules prior to the 
more important ultimate goal of fostering rational autonomy in persons (2003). 
Kant thought education should aim at the universal good because the 
universal good is humanities destinyii. Education is universally good, for Kant, 
when it enables all persons to reason for themselves. He stated that it ‘is 
through good education that all the good in the world arises’ (Kant, 2003, p 
15). This utterance may represent a clue as to why Biesta thinks discussions 
about the value and purpose of education need to focus on what constitutes 
good education. Biesta certainly appears to have been influenced by Kant’s 
idea that good education is needed for all. He recently remarked that ‘the duty 
of education is to ensure that there is good education for everyone 
everywhere’ (Biesta, 2015, p 81).  
However, unlike Kant, Biesta doubts whether there is a ‘universal’ human 
good determinable in advance that it is the task of education to promote. 
Indeed, Biesta specifically wants to question the Kantian view that attaining 
the capacity for independent thought and rational freedom constitutes the only 
or proper ‘good’ of education. He remarks that with ‘Kant autonomy based 
upon the use of reason became the marker of humanity – which left those 
who were considered to be not or not yet rational, including children, in a 
“difficult” position’ (Biesta, 2010, p 77). What is wrong with the reason-based 
humanism of Kant is that is it not open to the possibility that newcomers might 
alter what it means to be human. Indeed, Biesta implies that the Kantian 
account of human subjectivity needs to be replaced by a more open and less 
  
reason orientated account of human subjectivity. Biesta does still think 
education should aim to inculcate student subjectication, just subjectification 
of a different sort. Two concepts are central to Biesta’s account of education 
for subjectification: coming into the world and uniqueness (2010, p 81).  
Biesta draws upon Hannah Arendt to explain the former idea.  
For Arendt we live in a world populated by others who are unlike us. In order 
to come into such a world of diverse persons, action is necessary. Acting 
entails doing something new, something that has not been done before. 
However, Biesta explains that it is always possible that other persons may 
take up such ‘new’ actions and beginnings in unpredicted ways. Thus, there is 
a two-fold sense to human subjectivity for both Biesta and Arendt. Subjects 
both initiate new actions and are also subjected to the consequences of their 
actions. Here the uniqueness of each person becomes significant: it is 
because the world is made up of persons who are different from each other 
that the consequences of new actions are not predictable. Biesta explicitly 
states his preference for this two-fold interpretation of human subjectification 
(2010, p 83). Unlike Kant’s account of human subjectivity, coming into the 
world as a subject is only possible when it is accepted that all persons are in 
some way unique and not knowable in advance on account of their capacity 
for rational autonomy. 
Biesta develops the idea of educating for human uniqueness further with 
reference to the work of Levinas and especially Lingis (1994). According to 
Biesta, what matters to Levinas and Lingis is not so much that persons are 
uniquely different from others, but that they are irreplaceably unique (2010). 
Here Biesta draws upon Lingis to suggest that ‘rational communities’ may be 
closed off to the voices and actions of those deemed different. Moreover, 
Biesta claims that education plays a key part in reproducing such ‘rational 
communities’. While Biesta and Lingis both stress that rational communities 
are not without value, they nonetheless feel that rational communities are not 
open to ‘uncommon’ views. Instead rational communities only permit 
‘representative’ voices to be heard. Biesta explains this like so:   
‘We expect from Doctors, electricians, airline pilots and so on 
that they speak according to the rules and principles of the 
rational discourse of the community of which they are a 
representative. This means, however, that the thing that matters 
when they speak is what is said… who is saying it is immaterial 
as long as what is said (and done) “makes sense”…when we 
speak in this capacity we do not speak with our own voice but 
with the common voice of the community we represent…we 
  
are, therefore, interchangeable…our uniqueness does not 
count and is not at stake’ (Biesta, 2010, p 87) 
However, Biesta thinks human uniqueness should be at stake in education. 
He argues that if the world is divided up into a series of rational communities, 
newcomers will not be able to speak in their own voices. Newcomers will not, 
he suggests, be able to interrupt the ‘normal’ order. Counter to this Biesta 
argues that pedagogies must aim to keen open the possibility for newcomers 
to interrupt the ‘normal’ rational orders (2010, p 91). However, educators 
looking for guidance about how to help students ‘speak in their own voices’ 
will be disappointed. Biesta avers that educators cannot set out to ‘produce’ 
the emergence of such student uniqueness (2010). He states that ‘it is only 
when we give up the idea that human subjectivity can in some way be 
educationally produced that spaces might open up for uniqueness to come in 
to the world’ (2010, p 91). Biesta seems to here suggest there is an unhelpful 
surplus of reason in education that constrains possibilities for subjectification. 
Rational communities stifle the emergence of human uniqueness and inhibit 
persons from challenging accepted social orders.  
MacIntyre on the purposes of education  
Biesta (2010) thinks that the current preoccupation with measurement in 
education tends to encourage individuals to think about what they (or their 
offspring) can get out of education, instead of any shared consideration of the 
common public good. He argues that in the past public institutions did afford 
space through which private concerns could become public ones. However, 
he suggests that in contemporary life the public sphere has receded to such 
an extent that any ‘robust belief in the idea of the common good’ (2010, p 
103) has been lost. This is a theme developed by Alasdair MacIntyre. 
MacIntyre maintains that the prevailing values in public institutions in 
advanced modernity militate against students being able to learn to think 
about the common good (1987 & in debate with Dunne 2002). However, 
MacIntyre suggests that the reduction in opportunity for public debate about 
the common good is due to a lack of reason in public institutions rather than a 
surplus of it. MacIntyre implies that the rhetoric (rather than the reason) of the 
powerful in capitalist societies will continue to prevail in matters concerning 
the common good until there is an educated public able to hold the powerful 
to account.  Though MacIntyre concedes that the rhetoric of the powerful 
tends to prevail in advanced capitalist societies, he does not advocate that 
teachers give up on the task of trying to encourage students to reason about 
matters concerning the public goodiii. 
 
Indeed, in his lecture on The Idea of An Educated Public MacIntyre argues 
that western educators have two key purposes. They need to both 1) prepare 
students for a future social role, while also 2) supporting them to become able 
to think for themselves. He says that the first purpose of educators ‘is among 
  
the purposes of almost all education almost everywhere: it is to shape the 
young person so that he or she may fit into some social role or function…The 
second purpose is…the purpose of teaching young persons to think for 
themselves’ (1987, p 16). On the face of it, MacIntyre seems to be defending 
precisely the sort of Kantian view of education (aimed at promoting rational 
autonomy in students) that Biesta seeks to call into question. However, while 
MacIntyre cites Kant in his lecture on the educated public, he is not a Kantian 
thinker. In his well-known book After Virtue, he argued that the Kantian 
Enlightenment project was doomed to fail because the idea that it is possible 
to rationally determine the universal human good does not take into account 
that different communities have diverse, at times incompatible, ideas about 
the human good. However, MacIntyre revises rather than gives up on the idea 
that educators should help students' thinks for themselves about what it might 
be good for them to do in their lives.  
Thinking for oneself 
The first thing to note about MacIntyre’s defence of the idea that educators 
ought to encourage students to think for themselves is that he regards this as 
a necessarily communal process. He states that ‘it is a familiar truth that one 
can only think for oneself if one does not think by oneself’ (1987, p 24). 
MacIntyre seems to suggest there are at least two ways in which persons can 
so learn to think for themselves. On the one hand persons can learn to think 
for themselves via rational debate with others about matters concerning the 
common public good (MacIntyre 1987, 1990 & 2002 with Dunne). MacIntyre 
argues that a vital aspect of thinking for one self entails asking questions of 
currently dominant social and economic orders (MacIntyre 2002 with Dunne). 
For educators in Western culture this may mean supporting students to ask 
questions about why society is so geared toward the accumulation of 
individual wealth and the growth of a market economy rather than on the more 
even distribution of wealth for the overall common good. It may also mean 
encouraging students to ask questions about the massive debt burden being 
thrust upon an unprecedented number of persons today (MacIntyre 2013). 
Thus thinking for oneself should not be confused with thinking of oneself. The 
person that thinks of themself merely uses reason to accumulate goods for 
themselves. The person who thinks for themselves is not so self orientated. 
They are committed to asking questions about unjust social orders, and they 
are concerned with the pursuit of the common good as well as their own.  
On the other hand persons can learn to think for themselves by reading and 
then debating canonical texts. MacIntyre argues that close reading and 
debating of texts in university seminars can help provide persons with shared 
frames of reference that can inform debate about the common good. For if 
debate about the common good is to be based on reason rather than rhetoric 
  
then shared frames of reference and standards of appeal by which arguments 
can be judged as better or worse are needed (MacIntyre 2002 with Dunne). 
However, to be committed to rational debate about issues concerning the 
public good is not to be blind or indifferent to the reality of human diversity. 
Indeed, for MacIntyre it is often through engagement with texts from different 
traditions and persons from other cultures and backgrounds that we learn 
most. In this respect, though MacIntyre has been accused (see Harris, 2012) 
of adopting a view of community that is not open to the uncommon, I am 
inclined to disagree. After all, he specifies that debates in educated publics 
are open to the introduction of new discoveries, possibilities and points of 
view (MacIntyre & Dunne 2002). While certain discourses may sometimes 
prevent uncommon voices from being heard in public, for MacIntyre it is 
ultimately prejudice and rhetoric rather than reason than leads to such 
indifference to difference. iv 
The input-output model of education 
MacIntyre’s philosophy of education is also a partly liberal one. He says that 
towards the end of formal education, educators need to be able to help 
students pursue practices like historical, scientific or literary inquiry for their 
own sake rather than for later reward. He states that ‘part of what such 
students need to learn is to value, for example, the activities and outcomes of 
scientific enquiry for their own sake and not just for the technologies that 
result from such enquiry. Students who ask about their academic disciplines 
`But what use are they to us after we leave school?' should be taught that the 
mark of someone who is ready to leave school is that they no longer ask that 
question’ (MacIntyre with Dunne, 2002, p 5). Unlike Biesta, MacIntyre is clear 
then that the pursuit of different bodies of knowledge ought to be regarded as 
worthwhile in and of itself, at least at times, in educational institutions. 
However, like Biesta, MacIntyre is sceptical of only valuing educational 
institutions according to their efficiency and productivity and their capacity to 
support students to attain high grades in important examinations. MacIntyre 
dubs a fixation with measurement and student examination as an input/output 
model of education.  
What is ‘wrong with this model is that it loses sight of the end of education, the 
development of its students' powers, and substitutes for this end that of 
success by the standard of some test or examination. Yet what examinations 
principally test is how good one is at passing examinations’ (MacIntyre with 
Dunne, 2002, p 4). Instead of adopting the input-output model, MacIntyre 
suggests educational institutions should focus on extending the power of 
students’ to both think for themselves and act for the common good 
(MacAllister, 2015). There are similarities then between the views of Biesta 
and MacIntyre. Both think there is a too much measurement in education. 
Both also think educational institutions need to provide spaces for students to 
  
interrupt dominant social orders. However, there are also important 
differences of opinion. Whereas Biesta seems to think ‘communities’ are often 
too rational, MacIntyre thinks they are not rational enough. However, contrary 
to Barr’s allegation (2008), MacIntyre does not hold the view that only rational 
argument can improve the conditions of human community.v 
Practical reason and education for the common good 
‘Practical rationality is a property of individuals-in-their-social 
relationships rather than of individuals-as-such...Our primary 
shared and common good is found in that activity of communal 
learning through which we together become able to order 
goods…Such practical learning is a kind of learning that takes 
place in and through activity, and in and through reflection 
upon that activity, in the course of both communal and 
individual deliberation’ (MacIntyre, 1998, pp 242-243) 
While MacIntyre thinks debating canonical texts and issues concerning the 
public good are ways in which persons can learn to reason about the common 
good, he does not think these are the only ways in which the common good 
may be worked towards.  Indeed, in Politics, Philosophy and the Common 
Good, MacIntyre suggests that the primary common good of human persons 
entails collective acts of practical learning. He holds that through practical 
activity with others, each person can learn what it is good for them to do in 
their life. According to MacIntyre, working out what is good for a person to do 
in their life is a matter of practical reason - and each person can only learn do 
this with others. He argues that taking part in co-operative practices (he gives 
fishing, farming, playing in an orchestra and being part of a team of scientists 
as examples) can afford opportunities for persons to think with others about 
what it is good for them to do in their lives. He suggests that the person of 
practical reason has learned how to order the activities of their life in such a 
way that they are able to think about more than their own immediate desires. 
Here he says that young persons need to learn which of their desires are for 
genuine goods and which are not (2013b). Genuine goods enable individual 
and communal human flourishing. False goods meanwhile merely serve the 
ends of the current (consumer driven and individualistic) economic order 
(2013b). Persons of practical reason, he suggests, desire genuine as 
opposed to false human goods – they have learned how to think for 
themselves and act for the common good. vi  
 
Here, MacIntyre indicates that the way in which persons are initiated into 
practices is crucial. If persons are only encouraged to perform the practice in 
a specialist and compartmentalized way with a focus on their individual 
desires alone then it will become all too easy for common concerns to get lost. 
If on the other hand persons are encouraged to consider how their 
performance of the practice might influence the course of their life and those 
of others in the longer term then it will be much easier to raise issues 
  
concerning the public goodvii. While the dominant social and economic orders 
are very good at preventing such practical reason about the common good 
from emerging MacIntyre does not think educators should give up (2013b). He 
argues that a ‘utopianism of the present’ is needed to combat the ideology of 
advanced capitalism. While utopians of the future sacrifice the present for the 
future, utopians of the present refuse to sacrifice away the present. Instead, 
they insist that ‘the range of present possibilities is always greater than the 
established order is able to allow for’ (MacIntyre, 2013b, p 17). MacIntyre 
explains that it is in situations of everyday conflict that utopian questions 
about the common good really matter.  
He argues that what is needed is ‘a transformative political imagination, one 
that opens up opportunities for people to do kinds of things that they hitherto 
had not believed they were capable of doing. And this can happen when… 
parents become involved in some community that sustains their children’s 
school’  (ibid, p 17). MacIntyre argues that it sometimes becomes possible for 
people in a community to reflect upon the sort of school they want their 
children to attend. When this opportunity for participation and decision-making 
about the purposes of a school emerges the ‘achievement of human goods 
often takes new and unpredicted forms for which the existing social order 
hitherto afforded no space’ (MacIntyre, 2013b, p 17). What MacIntyre is 
alluding to here is that though many contemporary schools do not provide 
much in the way of opportunity to help young persons think for themselves 
and act for the common good, this need not always be the case, especially if 
persons in communities can come together to question the purposes of their 
schools. Thus, for MacIntyre, it is possible for educational institutions to 
become places where collective action can subvert the individualistic ideals of 
advanced capitalism. This could entail rational debate about the common 
good or collective practical reasoning about what it may be good for people to 
do in their lives. It might also entail persons in communities coming together 
to think about the purposes of schooling. 
While I am largely sympathetic then to many of MacIntyre’s claims concerning 
education, they do not all convince. For example, his belief that establishing 
and maintaining distinct faith schools (such as Protestant, Catholic or Islamic 
ones) in the same locality might further conditions of tolerance and 
understanding may be a little paradoxical. For if the best way to overcome 
prejudice is to encourage people to live together and participate in shared 
projects as MacIntyre has it, why encourage young persons of different faiths 
to be educated in separate schools? Even if extensive effort is made to 
ensure that pupils and teachers from such different schools frequently 
intermingle (as MacIntyre says they should in conversation with Dunne 2002), 
if the aim is to learn to live together why not actually live together all the time 
when at school? Nor does the hope that alternative forms of schooling (driven 
  
by something other than the needs of the market economy) can spring into 
existence seem wholly realistic. In the current climate of measurement I 
personally do not find it easy to imagine many Western educational 
institutions and systems being able to consistently resist, let alone overcome, 
the competitive and individualistic social and economic values that 
increasingly animate Western culture.  
It is telling that MacIntyre goes all the way back to the time of the Scottish 
Enlightenment to provide an example of an education system that actually 
fulfills his criteria for an educated public. His recent avowal that ‘we badly 
need good empirical studies of both success and failure in creating forms of 
schooling that enable children, their parents, and their teachers to achieve 
forms of good not otherwise achievable’ (p 17, 2013b) is probably not just a 
call for educational research studies of contemporary schools that are driven 
by something other than the needs of the market economy. It is also perhaps 
an acknowledgement that if such alternative practices of schooling exist at all, 
they do so sporadically, where they are as liable to failure as success. 
However, in fairness to MacIntyre, he defends the need for such utopian 
thinking about educational institutions on the grounds that it can help shed 
light on how far away educational institutions often are from where they 
should be. Utopian thinking can be instructive he seems to be saying even if it 
is not always realistic. It is also noteworthy that the tone of MacIntyre’s later 
work is more upbeat than what preceded it. His middle period works (such as 
After Virtue and the Idea of an Educated Public) were rather pessimistic about 
the prospect of capitalist values being subverted by collective thought and 
action for the common good. In contrast to this, his later thinking (see 
especially 1999, 2002 with Dunne and 2013b) does, despite some flaws, 
stress that educational institutions might yet still become places where 
persons can learn how to think for themselves and act for the common good.  
What should educational institutions be for? 
In this paper I have considered what educational institutions should be for. I 
have agreed with Biesta on a number of points. It is no doubt important that 
schools, colleges and universities ease young persons into society by 
initiating them into prevailing cultural orders and supporting them to obtain 
qualifications. I am generally in agreement with another of Biesta’s main 
arguments too: that reflection on the purposes of education is needed so as to 
challenge the culture of over doing and over valuing measurement. 
Educational institutions should do more than just socialise and qualify. In spite 
of these sympathies I have also suggested that Biesta’s tripartite framework 
regarding the purpose of education has at least three flaws. For one, it is 
overly prescriptive. Here I have questioned Biesta’s avowal that discussion of 
the purposes of education needs to entail reflection upon socialisation, 
  
subjectification and qualification. There is after all a rich variety of literature 
concerning the purposes of education that is not framed around issues of 
socialization, subjectification and qualification.  
A second problem with the scheme is that it does not consider the variety of 
ways in which the pursuit of knowledge might be valuable beyond the 
pragmatic. MacIntyre is much clearer than Biesta about the variety of ways in 
which the pursuit of knowledge may be educationally valuable. MacIntyre 
thinks knowledge ought to be pursued for its own sake, at least at times, while 
Biesta’s does not, as far as I am aware. MacIntyre (2009) is also explicit about 
how pursuing knowledge in a variety of different disciplines might enable 
students to develop the critical understanding necessary for questioning 
unjust social and economic arrangements. While Biesta does allude to how 
subjectification may occur when the content of education is seriously 
considered, this concept is, by Biesta’s own admission, difficult to grasp for 
English language speakers.  
Indeed, the final problem is to do with the elusiveness of the idea of 
subjectification. Biesta appears to suggest there is an unhelpful surplus of 
reason in education that constrains the emergence of human uniqueness and 
inhibits persons from challenging accepted social orders. Contrary to this, I 
have argued that that there is currently a deficit rather than a surplus of 
reason in education concerning the public good. In this respect, I have drawn 
upon MacIntyre to suggest that educational institutions should support 
students to think for themselves and act for the common good. MacIntyre 
stresses that we need to think with others in order to think for ourselves.  Here 
educators need to assist students to together acquire, question, debate and 
remake valued knowledge. Knowledge traditions are not for MacIntyre certain, 
and their value is not restricted to the individual. Indeed, Macintyre argues 
that thinking for one self entails questioning dominant social and economic 
orders, especially when they are unjust. Thinking for oneself is therefore 
linked to the idea of acting for the common good. Acting for the common good 
entails striking a balance between pursuing goods for one self and supporting 
others to get goods. It involves collective acts of practical learning, where 
each person learns what it might be good for them to do in their life. Acting for 
the common good may also involve collective action that subverts the 
individualistic ideals of advanced capitalism.  
 
While there are no doubt similarities between the work of MacIntye and 
Biesta, there are also important differences. Whereas Biesta seems to think 
‘communities’ are sometimes too rational, MacIntyre thinks they are not 
rational enough. For MacIntyre it is prejudice and rhetoric (rather than reason) 
that prevents the voices of the uncommon from being heard. Whereas Biesta 
suggests educators cannot produce student subjectification, MacIntyre 
suggests educators should not give up on the idea that they can help young 
persons to collectively think about what it may be good for them to do in their 
lives. Biesta and MacIntyre do however seem to agree that ongoing debate 
about the purposes of education is needed if communities are to be altered for 
  
the better.viii I am also inclined to agree. For as MacIntyre suggests, if parents, 
teachers, school pupils, students, politicians, academics and other persons 
besides these do together question the purpose of educational institutions it 
may become possible to interrupt the individualistic ideals that pervade much 
contemporary public life. Indeed, in this age of measurement, utopian thinking 
about the purposes of education may be needed, now, more than ever. 
 
Notes 
                                                
i However, it should be acknowledged that Biesta is elsewhere more 'modest' about 
his threefold framework, suggesting that it might be ‘one way’ (2009), of enabling 
thought about the purposes of education rather than the only way (2010). 
ii For further discussion of Kant’s idea that education should foster the universal 
good, see Kant (2003), chapter 1 especially. 
iii For further discussion of this point see MacIntyre and Dunne (2002) and MacAllister 
(2015). 
iv For further discussion of this issue see MacAllister (2015) and MacIntyre and 
Dunne (2002) 
v For further critical discussion of MacIntyre’s philosophy see Horton and Mendus 
(1994). For discussion of criticisms of MacIntyre’s philosophy of education see 
MacAllister (2015). 
vi For further discussion of the idea that MacIntyre’s philosophy of education entails 
supporting students to think for themselves and act for the common good see 
MacAllister (2015) 
vii Dunne has of course criticised MacIntyre for not classifying teaching as a practice 
(MacIntyre and Dunne 2002). However what seems most important for MacIntyre is 
that practices are performed in educational spaces in such ways that the common 
good is thought about and worked towards. Whether teaching is considered to be a 
practice or not is very much a secondary issue. 
viii MacIntyre and Biesta are not the only scholars to air such views. Winch for 
example argues that there is a need for the various people who have a stake in 
education (including parents, teachers, students and teachers) to engage in serious 
debate about the purposes of education. However he concludes such debate has yet 
to happen in the UK despite high profile calls for it. He claims that in the absence of 
such meaningful debate about the ends education in the UK a dominant liberal 
tradition ‘exercises undue sway over the system as a whole, to its considerable 
detriment’ (1996, P 42). What is needed instead, Winch suggests, is a ‘vocational 
education of a liberal temper’ (ibid, p 42). 
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